A simple wolf in sheeps clothing, now buck naked!

LCU ‘WAR 360’ : The wolf is on the run, the sheep are in stampede.

I can say confidently, we saw the bite of ugly transparent shallow American thinking drawing near.
The time has come to Pay the Piper.

Guest Featured below, one of the best ‘first words’ opening the ultimate debate of the millenia:
{and this, along with the perversity of the warmongers, is why,
if we were elsewhere than Arizona, we’d be "Gone Fishing".
 Instead, "See you on the mountain!"

logo

SATURDAY 30 MAY 2009

Opinion

Facebook

DIGG

Maybe We Should Take the North Koreans at Their Word

Wednesday 27 May 2009

by: Tad Daley  |  Visit article original @ Tikkun.org

photo
A South Korean marine stands guard at an anti-aircraft gun position on Yeonpyeong
Island in the disputed waters of the Yellow Sea on May 28, 2009. (Photo: Getty
images)

    Shortly after North Korea exploded its second nuclear device in three years
on Monday morning, it released a statement explaining why. "The republic
has conducted another underground nuclear testing successfully in order to strengthen
our defensive nuclear deterrence."(1) If the Obama Administration
hopes to dissuade Pyongyang from the nuclear course it seems so hell bent on
pursuing, Washington must understand just how adroitly nuclear arms do appear
to serve North Korea’s national security. In other words, perhaps we should
recognize that they mean what they say.

    From the dawn of history until the dawn of the nuclear age, it seemed rather
self-evident that for virtually any state in virtually any strategic situation,
the more military power one could wield relative to one’s adversaries, the more
security one gained. That all changed, however, with Alamogordo and Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. During the Cold War’s long atomic arms race, it slowly dawned
on "nuclear use theorists" – whom one can hardly resist acronyming
as NUTS – that in the nuclear age, security did not necessarily require superiority.
Security required simply an ability to retaliate after an adversary had struck,
to inflict upon that opponent "unacceptable damage" in reply. If an
adversary knew, no matter how much devastation it might inflict in a first strike,
that the chances were good that it would receive massive damage as a consequence
(even far less damage than it had inflicted as long as that damage was "unacceptable"),
then, according to the logic of nuclear deterrence, that adversary would be
dissuaded from striking first. What possible political benefit could outweigh
the cost of the possible obliteration of, oh, a state’s capital city, and the
leaders of that state themselves, and perhaps more than a million lives therein?

    Admittedly, the unassailable logic of this "unacceptable damage"
model of nuclear deterrence – which we might as well call UD – failed to put
the brakes on a spiraling Soviet/American nuclear arms competition that began
almost immediately after the USSR acquired nuclear weapons of its own in 1949.
Instead, a different model of nuclear deterrence emerged, deterrence exercised
by the capability completely to wipe out the opponent’s society, "mutually
assured destruction," which soon came to be known to all as MAD. There
were other scenarios of aggression – nuclear attacks on an adversary’s nuclear
weapons, nuclear or conventional attacks on an adversary’s closest allies (in
Western and Eastern Europe) – that nuclear weapons were supposed to deter as
well. However, the Big Job of nuclear weapons was to dissuade the other side
from using their nuclear weapons against one’s own cities and society, by threatening
to deliver massive nuclear devastation on the opponent’s cities and society
in reply. "The Department of Defense," said an Ohio congressman in
the early 1960s, with some exasperation, "has become the Department of
Retaliation."(2)

    Nevertheless, those who engaged in an effort to slow the arms race often employed
the logic of UD in their attempts to do so. "Our twenty thousandth bomb,"
said Robert Oppenheimer, who directed the Manhattan Project that built the world’s
first atomic weapons, as early as 1953, "will not in any deep strategic
sense offset their two thousandth."(3) "Deterrence does not depend
on superiority," said the great strategist Bernard Brodie in 1965.(4) "There
is no foreign policy objective today that is so threatened," said retired
admiral and former CIA director Stansfield Turner in 1998, "that we would
É accept the risk of receiving just one nuclear detonation in retaliation."(5)

    Consider how directly the logic of UD applies to the contemporary international
environment, to the twin nuclear challenges that have dominated the headlines
during most of the past decade, and to the most immediate nuclear proliferation
issues now confronting the Obama Administration. Because the most persuasive
explanation for the nuclear quests on which both Iran and North Korea have embarked
is, indeed, the notion that "deterrence does not depend on superiority."
Deterrence depends only an ability to strike back. Iran and North Korea appear
to be seeking small nuclear arsenals in order to deter potential adversaries
from launching an attack upon them – by threatening them with unacceptable damage
in retaliation.

    Neither North Korea nor Iran could hope to defeat its most powerful potential
adversary – the United States – in any kind of direct military confrontation.
They cannot repel an actual attack upon them. They cannot shoot American planes
and missiles out of the sky. Indeed, no state can.

    However, what these countries can aspire to do is to dissuade the American
leviathan from launching such an attack. How? By developing the capability to
instantly vaporize an American military base or three in Iraq or Qatar or South
Korea or Japan, or an entire U.S. aircraft carrier battle group in the Persian
Gulf or the Sea of Japan, or even an American city on one coast or the other.
And by making it implicitly clear that they would respond to any kind of assault
by employing that capability immediately, before it’s too late, following the
venerable maxim: "Use them or lose them." The obliteration of an entire
American military base, or an entire American naval formation, or an entire
American city, would clearly seem to qualify as "unacceptable damage"
for the United States.

    Moreover, to deter an American attack, Iran and North Korea do not need thousands
of nuclear warheads. They just need a couple of dozen, well hidden and well
protected. American military planners might be almost certain that they could
take out all the nuclear weapons in these countries in some kind of a dramatic
lightning "surgical strike." However, with nuclear weapons, "almost"
is not good enough. Even the barest possibility that such a strike would fail,
and that just one or two nuclear weapons would make it into the air, detonate
over targets, and result in massive "unacceptable damage" for the
United States, would in virtually any conceivable circumstance serve to dissuade
Washington from undertaking such a strike.

    In addition, it is crucial to recognize that Iran and North Korea would not
intend for their nascent nuclear arsenals to deter only nuclear attacks upon
them. If the entire nuclear arsenal of the United States disappeared tomorrow
morning, but America’s conventional military superiority remained, it still
would be the case that the only possible military asset that these states could
acquire, to effectively deter an American military assault, would be the nuclear
asset.

    The "Korean Committee for Solidarity with World Peoples," a mouthpiece
for the North Korean government, captured Pyongyang’s logic quite plainly just
weeks after the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003. "The Iraqi war
taught the lesson that É the security of the nation can be protected
only when a country has a physical deterrent force É"(6) Similarly,
a few weeks earlier, just before the Iraq invasion began, a North Korean general
was asked to defend his country’s nuclear weapons program, and with refreshing
candor replied, "We see what you are getting ready to do with Iraq. And
you are not going to do it to us."(7)

    It really is quite a remarkable development. North Korea today is one of the
most desperate countries in the world. Most of its citizens are either languishing
in gulags or chronically starving. And yet – in contrast to all the debate that
has taken place in recent years about whether the United States and/or Israel
ought to launch a preemptive strike on Iran – no one seems to be proposing any
kind of military strike on North Korea. Why not? Because of the mere possibility
that North Korea could impose unacceptable damage upon us in reply.

    Perhaps the most remarkable thing about UD is that it seems every bit as effective
as MAD. North Korea today possesses no more than a handful of nuclear warheads,
and maintains nothing like a "mutual" nuclear balance with the United
States. In addition, the retaliation that North Korea can threaten cannot promise
anything like a complete "assured destruction." To vaporize an American
carrier group in the Sea of Japan, or a vast American military base in South
Korea or Japan, or even an American city, would not be at all the same thing
as the "destruction" of the entire American nation – as the USSR was
able to threaten under MAD.

    And yet, MAD and UD, it seems, exercise deterrence in precisely the same way.
Astonishingly, it seems that Washington finds itself every bit as thoroughly
deterred by a North Korea with probably fewer than 10 nuclear weapons as it
did by a Soviet Union with 10,000. Although UD hardly contains the rich acronymphomaniacal
irony wrought by MAD, it appears that both North Korea and Iran intend now to
base their national security strategies solidly upon it.

    There is very little reason to suppose that other states will not soon follow
their lead.

    President Obama, of course, to his great credit, has not only made a nuclear
weapon-free Iran and North Korea one of his central foreign policy priorities,
he has begun to chart a course toward a nuclear weapon-free world. In a groundbreaking
speech before a huge outdoor rally in Prague on April 5th, he said, "Today,
I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and
security of a world without nuclear weapons." (Unfortunately, he followed
that with the statement that nuclear weapons abolition would not "be achieved
quickly, perhaps not in my lifetime," suggesting that neither he nor the
nuclear policy officials in his administration fully appreciate the magnitude
and immediacy of the nuclear peril. Do they really think the human race can
retain nuclear weapons for another half century or so, yet manage to dodge the
bullet of nuclear accident, or nuclear terror, or a nuclear crisis spinning
out of control every single time?)

    The one thing we can probably say for sure about the prospects for universal
nuclear disarmament is that no state will agree either to abjure or to dismantle
nuclear weapons unless it believes that such a course is the best course for
its own national security. To persuade states like North Korea and Iran to climb
aboard the train to abolition would probably require simultaneous initiatives
on three parallel tracks. One track would deliver foreign and defense policies
that assure weaker states that we do not intend to attack them, that just as
we expect them to abide by the world rule of law they can expect the same from
us, that the weak need not cower in fear before the strong. Another track would
deliver diplomatic overtures that convince weaker states that on balance, overall,
their national security will better be served in a world where no one possesses
nuclear weapons, rather than in a world where they do-but so too do many others.
And another track still would deliver nuclear weapons policies that directly
address the long-simmering resentments around the world about the long-standing
nuclear double standard, that directly acknowledge our legacy of nuclear hypocrisy,
and that directly connect nuclear non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament.

    The power decisively to adjust all those variables, of course, does not reside
in Pyongyang or Tehran. It resides instead in Washington.

    ——-

    (1) The Washington Post, May 25, 2009.

    (2) Quoted in Daniel Lang, An Inquiry Into Enoughness: Of Bombs and Men and
Staying Alive (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 167.

    (3) Quoted in Ibid., p. 38.

    (4) Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1971 – first published in 1965), p. 274, quoted in Sarah J. Diehl and
James Clay Moltz, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation: A Reference Handbook
(Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2002), p. 34.

    (5) Quoted in The Nation, Special Issue Containing Jonathan Schell’s interviews
with several nuclear policy professionals and intellectuals, February 2/9, 1998,
p. 40.

    (6) Quoted in Securing Our Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention,
Tilman Ruff and John Loretz, eds. (Boston: IPPNW, 2007), p. 37.

    (7) Don Oberdorfer, PBS, The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, October 9, 2006, quoted
in Jonathan Schell, The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger (New
York: Henry Holt, 2007), p. 141.

    ———

    Tad Daley is the Writing Fellow with International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War, the Nobel Peace Laureate disarmament advocacy organization.
His first book, Apocalypse Never: Forging the Path to a Nuclear Weapon-Free
World, is forthcoming from Rutgers University Press in January 2010.

»


IN ACCORDANCE WITH TITLE 17 U.S.C. SECTION
107, THIS MATERIAL IS DISTRIBUTED WITHOUT PROFIT TO THOSE WHO HAVE
EXPRESSED A PRIOR INTEREST IN RECEIVING THE INCLUDED INFORMATION FOR
RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES. TRUTHOUT HAS NO AFFILIATION
WHATSOEVER WITH THE ORIGINATOR OF THIS ARTICLE NOR IS TRUTHOUT ENDORSED
OR SPONSORED BY THE ORIGINATOR.

"VIEW SOURCE ARTICLE" LINKS
ARE PROVIDED AS A CONVENIENCE TO OUR READERS AND ALLOW FOR VERIFICATION
OF AUTHENTICITY. HOWEVER, AS ORIGINATING PAGES ARE OFTEN UPDATED BY
THEIR ORIGINATING HOST SITES, THE VERSIONS POSTED ON TO MAY NOT MATCH
THE VERSIONS OUR READERS VIEW WHEN CLICKING THE "VIEW SOURCE ARTICLE"
LINKS.

Comments

Let us not forget that the

Fri, 05/29/2009 – 17:09 — Anonymous (not verified)

Let us not forget that the U.S. Air Force used conventional Napalm
bombs to burn every city in North Korea to the ground (some of them
more than once) during the "Forgotten War," 1950 to 1953. Pyongyang
itself was destroyed twice. The estimate of the number of civilians who
perished in the firestorms ranges between 2 and 4 million. Only
President Truman’s opposition kept General MacArthur from using nuclear
weapons in North Korea, along the Chinese border.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s